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Abstract
This paper extends Salop’s model of localized competition by introducing the consumers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for clean products and allows an individual firm to choose between a 
clean or a dirty technology. We assume that a clean technology is relatively costly to adopt. The 
consumer is willing to pay more for a product produced with clean technology and the model 
can also be interpreted as a world economy model where each firm represents a country. There 
exists a critical value of m (proportion of firms adopting the clean technology), m*, such that if 
m < m* then no country adopts the clean technology, all countries adopt the clean technology only 
if m > m* while some countries will adopt the clean technology and some will not adopt the clean 
technology if m = m*. Our results also identify an example of coordination failure. Since symmetric 
technology adoption delivers the same level of profits as non-adoption, global coordination will 
be necessary to achieve the clean technology adoption outcome. Finally, we demonstrate that the 
private and public (social planner) incentives to adopt clean technology differ.
JEL Classifications: C72, D43, D60, F12
Keywords: clean technology, willingness to pay, coordination failure
1. Introduction
The issue of the adoption of clean technology in production has important 
implications for the world environment and world trade and much has been written 
on technology adoption across countries, the race to the bottom and pollution havens 
(Copeland and Taylor, 2004). This paper emphasizes the relationship between the 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a product produced with clean technology and 
the strategic interaction among countries (firms) in competing for market share. Studies 
by Wustenhagen, Markard and Truffer (2003) in Switzerland and Moon, Florkowski, 
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Bruckner and Schonhof (2002) in Germany demonstrate that consumers are willing to 
pay a premium for environmentally benign production techniques.1
Our paper extends the analysis of Salop’s (1979) model of localized or regional 
competition. Thus, this would capture trade between China and Australia, or China (or 
Australia) and the Asia Pacific. It is shown that, with a positive WTP, some firms adopt 
the clean technology while others do not (asymmetric adoption). If all countries adopt 
clean technology (symmetric adoption), each firm will face a symmetric market size 
with intense competition, forcing them to charge the same price. This may result in the 
firms earning less profit. On the other hand, if some firms adopt and others do not, then 
each firm will face an asymmetric market size with price differentials and may earn a 
higher profit. This result is driven by the fraction ( m ) of total firms that adopt, θ which 
captures the consumers’ WTP and the marginal cost of production c.
Our results also identify an example of coordination failure. Although symmetric 
technology adoption delivers the same level of profits, global co-ordination may be 
necessary to achieve the clean technology adoption outcome.
Finally, we show that the private and public (social planner) incentive to adopt 
clean technology differs and that given the World Trade Organization (WTO) policies, 
a solution to reducing emissions is to educate/inform the consumer in order to increase 
their WTP.
2. Model
2.1 Firms
We consider an N-country and N-variety world economy model.2 Each country Ci 
consists of one individual firm i which produces brand i good and competes in the global 
market, where i = {1,2,3,... N}. Since each country Ci consists of only one firm i, each 
firm represents its own country and vice versa. We assume that these are equidistant 
countries located on the unit-circumference of a circle. This also implies that there are N 
equidistant firms located on unit-circumference of a circle, where N > 1. 
The location of the firm is denoted by the sequence of integers3:
n = l (N ) = 1– N2 ,
1– N
2 +1,…, 0,1,…, l (N ) =
N – 1
2
We assume that {g} is the approximation of g to its larger integer. For example, if 
N = 4 then this implies that l (4) = –1, l (4) = 2 and those firms are located on the 
following sequence of integers: {–1,0,1,2}. Furthermore, we assume that N is given, 
1 Moon et al. (2002) found the “majority of respondents were willing to pay a premium of various sizes 
for environmentally benign techniques”. This “provides a solid incentive for farmers to consider converting to 
environmentally friendly practices”. The issue of whether this also led to an increase in total market size was 
not discussed and their results are more in line with the circular city approach.
2 Like Gandel and Shy (2001), although our analysis differs from theirs.
3 We follow the sequence, which is mentioned in Alderighi and Piga (2008).
Munirul H. Nabin and Pasquale M. Sgro 
 Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 193–210
195
i.e., the number of total independent countries will remain constant. Following the 
assumption of Alderighi and Piga (2008), we denote h  as the number of locations 
separating any two firms. For firm n, h < 0 identifies the firm which is its h -step 
clockwise neighbor, while h > 0 refers to the firm n’s h-step counter - clockwise 
neighbor (Alderighi and Piga, 2008).4 For given technology T, each firm i is producing 
output qi and engaging in Bertrand price competition.
2.1.1 Technology
Assume that each firm faces a constant marginal cost of production γ to produce 
one unit of output. Without loss of generality, we normalize γ to zero. Two technologies 
are available and these are T = {TE, TC}, where TE is an existing technology, which is 
not environmentally friendly, and TC is a clean technology, which is environmentally 
friendly. In addition, technology TC incurs constant marginal cost c, whereas TE incurs 
no extra cost.  If XT, for a given technology T, is the measure of pollution emission per 
unit of output then we assume the following:
XT =
0 if an individual firm adopts technology TC ,
sˆ > 0 if an individual firm adopts technology TE .
 (1)
where sˆ is the emission per unit of output. This implies that TC is a clean technology and 
the adoption of clean technology is costly, as c >  0. 
An individual firm i, which is located on the nth location of the unit-circumference 
of a circle, will face two close neighborhood competitive firms who are located on the 
(n + 1)th and (n – 1)th location respectively. Ex-ante, given technology T, an individual 
firm located at the nth location will anticipate three possible scenarios regarding the 
adoption of clean technology for its close neighborhood firm. These possible scenarios 
are: (i) both firms adopt the clean technology, (ii) both firms do not adopt the clean 
technology or (iii) one will adopt the clean technology and the other firm will not. 
4 For more details, please see  Alderighi and Piga (2008), page 5 and Figure 1.
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Figure 1 illustrates the ex-ante three scenarios:
Figure 1 Ex-ante Three Possible Scenarios
Firm located on nth location (for given technology T)
Firm located on (n – 1)th location
Firm either adopts clean
technology or not.
Firm located on (n + 1)th location
Firm either adopts clean
technology or not.
distance 1 / N distance 1 / N
2.1.2 Probability of the Adoption of Clean Technology
The ex-ante probability of the adoption of clean technology by the neighborhood 
firm is denoted m. An individual firm does not know the exact value of m but it knows 
that m is distributed over an interval [0,1]. Without loss of generality, we can also 
interpret m as the fraction of total firms that adopt the clean technology. 
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1:
A. Since m is a probability; it must lie between zero and one i.e. 0 ≤ m ≤ 1.
B. We assume that m  is normally distributed over an interval [0,1] with mean μm and 
variance σ 2m  i.e. (m)~N (μm, σ 2m).
Assumption 1 tells us that m is normally distributed over an Interval [0,1]. Each 
individual firm i will maximize the following objective function:
Pi
c – c( ) DiTe Pi c , Pj( ) 
Pi
d DiTe Pi d , Pj( )i
= (If firm i adopts the clean technology)
(Otherwise)
Here Pci  and Pdi are the prices charged by an individual firm i when it adopts the clean 
technology or existing technology, respectively. Pj is the price charged by neighborhood 
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firm j (where i, j = {1,2} and i ≠ j ) and DeiT(Pi, Pj ) is the expected quantity demand for 
firm i for a given technology T.
2.2 Consumers
Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the unit-circumference of 
a circle. Each consumer obtains utility k from the good that he or she consumes. In 
addition, each consumer is characterized by a parameter θ [0,1] where θ  is interpreted 
as his or her utility level for a product produced by using the clean technology only5. Let 
f (θ |m ) be the conditional probability density function of θ  given m distributed over 
interval [0,1]. The following properties are assumed to hold for  f (θ |m ):
Assumption 2
Assume a bivariate normal distribution with the following properties:6
A. f (θ |m ) has normal density for each value of  m [0,1].
B. fm(m)~N (μm, σ 2m), i.e., the marginal probability density function of m is normally 
distributed over an interval [0,1].
C. Conditional variance of θ  for given m , i.e., σ 2θ |m is independent.
D. If the above assumptions i.e. A, B and C hold, then it implies that E(θ |m) is linear in m, 
i.e., E(θ |m) = τ + ξm, where = –
m
m and =
m
.
Here, , σθ and σm are the correlation coefficient (for θ and m), standard deviations 
of θ and m respectively. Furthermore, μθ and μm are the mean values of θ and m 
respectively.
We denote t as the consumer’s transportation cost per unit of distance from her 
place x to her nearest firm’s location n. An individual consumer χ faces an inelastic 
demand and purchases one unit of good that minimizes the sum of the price and the 
transportation cost. Therefore, his or her net utility denoted by Vχ is as follows7:
V = k + – Pi – t | n – x | If she purchases a good using clean technologyk – Pi – t | n – x | Otherwise  
Suppose, firm i, which does not adopt the clean technology, is located at n = 0 and 
its nearest two firms are located at n – 1 = –1 and n + 1 = +1 respectively. Since they are 
equidistant firms, the distance between each firm will be 1
N
. Denote xˆ as the location of 
a consumer who is indifferent between buying goods from firm i and its neighborhood 
firm j. 
If its neighborhood firm j adopts the clean technology xˆ will be calculated as follows:
5 See also Economides (1993).
6 These are standard properties; for more details see Ghahramani (2004), page 449.
7 We assume that k is sufficiently large so that V > 0.
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k – Pi d – tx = k + – Pj – t
1
N – x xˆ =
1
2t Pj – Pi
d – + 12N xˆ1 (2)
If its neighborhood firm j does not adopt the clean technology xˆ will be calculated as 
follows:
k – Pi d – tx = k – Pj – t
1
N – x xˆ =
1
2t Pj – Pi
d + 12N xˆ2 (3)
Since firm i has customers on its left and right side, it will calculate its ex-ante 
expected demand for the three possible scenarios. Though firm i knows its own 
preference regarding its technology adoption choice, ex-ante, it does not know the 
preference of its rival firm j for the same. However, firm i assigns the probability m 
that firm j will adopt the clean technology and the probability (1 – m) that firm j does 
not adopt the clean technology. This also needs to be justified in the presence of three 
ex-ante possible scenarios (as mentioned previously). Figure 2 illustrates the game tree 
where the end nodes specify the adoption and non-adoption options:
Figure 2 Game Tree of Technology Adoption
Firm i either adopts the clean technology (c) or does not adopt (d)
Neighborhood two firms, each firm denoted as j
Scenario 1
m
c c cd d d
mm (1 – m) (1 – m) (1 – m)
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Firm i’s ex-ante expected demand will be as follows:
DiTE
e Pi
d , Pj( ) = m2 201 d0xˆ1 xdF | m( ) + 1– m( )2 201 d0xˆ2 xdF | m( )
+m 1– m( ) d
0
xˆ1
0
1
xdF | m( ) + d
0
xˆ2
0
1
xdF | m( )
 (4)
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By simplifying equation (4), it can be written as follows:
DiTE
e Pi
d , Pj( ) = a 12t Pj – Pi d( ) – E | m( ) + 12N + b 12t Pj – Pd( ) + 12N  (5)
Here, a = 2m2 + m(1 – m) and b = 2(1 – m)2 + m(1 – m). By using a similar 
calculation, we can derive the expected demand for firm i when it adopts the clean 
technology TC as:
DiTC
e Pi
c , Pj( ) = a 12t Pj – Pi c( ) + 12N + b 12t Pj – Pi c( ) + E | m( ) + 12N  (6)
Because of symmetry, firm i’s neighborhood firm j which is located either at -1 (i.e. 
on right hand side of firm i’s position on the circle) or +1 (i.e. on left hand side of firm 
i’s position on the circle) will calculate its own expected demand. Let D ejTE(P
c
i , Pj ) and 
D ejTC(P
d
i , Pj ) denote firm j’s ex-ante expected demand when it does not adopt the clean 
technology and when it does adopt clean technology, respectively. Therefore, firm j’s ex-
ante expected demand is as follows:
DjTE
e Pi
e , Pj( ) = a 12t Pi c – Pj( ) – E | m( ) + 12N + b 12t Pi c – Pj( ) + 12N
DjTC
e Pi
d , Pj( ) = a 12t Pi d – Pj( ) + 12N + b 12t Pi d – Pj( ) + E | m( ) + 12N
 (7)
2.3 Firm’s Profit Maximization Problem
Firm i’s profit maximization problem will be as follows:
Pi
c – c( ) DiTe Pi c , Pj( ) 
Pi
d DiTe Pi d , Pj( )i
= (If firm i adopts the clean technology)
(Otherwise)
E
C  (8)
Firm i is anticipating that firm j’s ex-ante profit maximization problem will be as 
follows:
Π j = m[(Pj – c)D ejTC(P
d
i , Pj )] + (1 – m)[Pj D ejTE(P
c
i , Pj )] (9)
This game is similar to the incomplete information game and to solve this game we 
need to find out the Nash Equilibrium. In order to do so, we consider firm i when it does 
not adopt the clean technology, as a separate player. Therefore, we need to derive the 
reaction functions for these three players and determine the strategy profile that solves 
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them simultaneously. The reaction functions are derived by evaluating the following 
first order conditions:
∂ i
∂Pi
c
= 0, ∂ i
∂Pi
d
= 0, and ∂ j
∂Pj
= 0
This yields the following reaction functions Rk where k = {i, j}:
Ric (Pj ) =
1
2 Pj +
t
N + c +
b
(a + b) E( | m)
Rid (Pj ) =
1
2 Pj +
t
N –
a
(a + b) E( | m)
Rj (Pi c , Pi d ) =
1
2 Pi
d + m(Pi c – Pi d ) +
t
N + mc +
E( | m)
(a + b) (a – m(a + b))  (10)
Here, R ci (Pj ), R di (Pj ) are the reaction functions of firm i when it adopts clean technology 
and when it does not, respectively. Rj (P ci, P di ) is the reaction function of firm j.
By solving the above system of equations, we obtain the following:
Pi
c* = 12 (1+ m)c +
t
N +
1
2 E( | m) m –
a – b
a + b
Pi
d * = 12 mc +
t
N + E( | m)
m
2 –
a
a + b
Pj
* = mc + tN + E( | m) m –
a
a + b
 (11)
From the above equations we obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: For any given m such that 0 < m < 1, E(θ |m) > 0 and c > 0, the following will 
be true: P ci
* > P *j > P di *.
Proof:
By using the equations in (11), we can calculate the following: 
(i) Pi c* – Pj* =
(1– m)
2 c + E( | m)[ ] > 0 Pi
c* > Pj*,
(ii) Pj* – Pi d * =
m
2 (c + E( | m)) > 0 Pj
* > Pi d *.
These imply that P ci * > P *j > P di *.
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The intuition of the above lemma is similar to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Here, 
firm i knows whether it adopts the clean technology, but it does not know whether its 
rival firms will do the same. As a result, it considers the expected outcome of its rival 
firms - there is m probability that its rival firm adopts the clean technology and (1 – m) 
probability it does not. Therefore, the expected cost of adoption of clean technology of 
its rival firm is mc + (1 – m)0 = mc. If firm i adopts the clean technology its cost is c and 
if it does not adopt the clean technology then its adoption cost will be zero. Note that 
since m (0,1), c > mc > 0. This implies that if firm i adopts the clean technology, it 
will face a higher cost than that of its rival firm and, as a result, firm i will charge a price 
higher than its rival firm’s price. Similarly, one can also explain why firm i charges a 
lower price than its rival firm when it does not adopt the clean technology.
The above discussion leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1:
A. When no one adopts the clean technology (i.e. m = 0), Pi* = Pj* =
t
N , which is a standard result in Salop’s circular model.
B. When everyone adopts the clean technology (i.e. m = 1), Pi* = Pj* =
t
N + cProof:
The proof of Proposition1 (A) follows from the fact that if no one adopts the clean 
technology c = E(θ |m) = 0 and by substituting these values in the relevant equations in 
(11) i.e. equations Pdi * and P *j , we obtain Pi* = Pj* =
t
N
. For the proof of Proposition 1 (B), 
calculate the value of a and b when everyone adopts the clean technology (m = 1). Given 
that m = 1  a = 2m2 + m(1 – m) = 2 and b = 2(1 – m)2 + m(1 – m) = 0. By substituting 
these values in the relevant equations in (11) i.e. P ci * and P *j , we obtain Pi* = Pj* =
t
N + c. This completes our proof.
2.3.1 Firm ’s Decision Regarding the Adoption of Clean Technology
By using equations (8)-(10), firm i’s  profit level at Nash Equilibrium will be as 
follows:
i
*
(a + b)
2t Pi
c* – c( )2
(a + b)
2t Pi
d *[ ]2
(If firm i adopts the clean technology)
(Otherwise)
=  (12)
An individual firm i has an incentive to adopt the clean technology if, and only if, 
the following condition is satisfied:
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(a + b)
2t (Pi
c* – c)2 ≥ (a + b)2t [Pi
d * ]2
Pi
c* – Pi d * ≥ c
1
2 [E( | m) + c] ≥ c
E( | m) ≥ c  (13)
where the values of P ci * and P di * are substituted from equation (11). Since m is the 
fraction of total firms that adopt the clean technology, we can solve for m by replacing 
the weak inequality sign with equality in equation (13). Therefore, we obtain the 
following (assuming that an interior solution exists):
E(θ |m) = c  m* (where m* is a critical threshold) (14)
Proposition 2:  For any given m, such that if m < m*, then no one adopts the clean 
technology and if m < m* then everyone adopts the clean technology. However, if m = m* 
then some firms will adopt the clean technology and some firms will not adopt the same.
Proof:  The proof follows from our conditions (13) and (14)
Figure 3 illustrates this proposition. From Assumption 2 (D) E(θ |m) is linear in m. 
Since both c and m lie over an interval [0,1], we can plot the two curves E(θ |m) and c. 
Assumption 2 (D) in equation (14), can be used to define $m^*$ explicitly as follows:
–
m
m +
m
m = c , (by Assumption 2 (D))
m* = m + m (c – )
 (15)
Since both m [0,1] and θ [0,1], for feasibility we require that: 0 ≤ E(θ |m) ≤ 1 and 
c [0,1]. 
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Figure 3 The adoption of Clean Technology
1
c
m = 0 m = 1m = m*
E(θ | m), c
E(θ | m)
No one adopts Everyone adopts
Figure 3 illustrates the case that for any given m such that m < m*, no one adopts 
the clean technology, while for m > m*, every one adopts the clean technology. At the 
interaction point of E(θ |m) and c curves, some firms adopt the clean technology and 
some firms do not adopt the same technology. Note that if m = 0 then μm = 0, therefore, 
E(θ |m) = τ = μθ > 0 as long as θ > 0 (from Assumption 2 (D)).
2.4 Decomposition of m* & Risk Adjustment Factor
In condition (15) m* is decomposed into two parts, (i) the expected value of m i.e. μm 
and (ii) m (c – ), let us call this term a risk adjustment factor. For given values of 
 > 0, σθ > 0 and σm > 0, this risk adjustment factor depends on (i) the consumers’ 
expected willingness to pay (WTP) μθ and (ii) the unit cost/marginal cost of clean 
technology adoption. Indeed, the risk adjustment factor explains why an individual firm 
deviates from μm. For example, if c > μθ then it raises the critical value of m* (follows 
from equation (15)). This implies that an individual firm has relatively less incentive 
to adopt the clean technology (follows from the Proposition 2). If the firm’s cost of 
clean technology adoption goes up, the adoption of clean technology becomes less 
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likely. However, the reverse will be true if c < μθ. In this case, m* will decrease and 
an individual firm has a relatively higher incentive to adopt the clean technology as it 
involves less risk. Note that if c = μθ then the critical m* will converge to its mean value 
μm. This observation leads to following proposition:
Proposition 3: For given parameters’ values such that  > 0, σθ > 0 and σm > 0, the 
following will be true:
A. m* is increasing in c but decreasing in μθ .
B. If c > μθ then m* > μm  and if μθ > c then m* < μm .
C. If c = μθ then m* will converge to its expected value m* = μm .
Proof: By differentiating equation (14) with respect to c and μθ , we obtain 
∂m*
∂c
= m > 0 and ∂m
*
∂
= – m < 0  respectively. Proposition 3(B) and Proposition 3 
(C) follow from equation (14).
One of the important aspects of the above analysis is that the solution for critical m* 
does not depend on transport cost t. The reason is that, since an individual consumer 
has to bear the transport cost, a firm always tries to identify the indifferent consumer to 
determine its market size irrespective of whether it adopts a clean technology or not8. 
Furthermore, if one examines the reaction function of each individual firm in equation 
(10) then it is easy to see that a change in t will lead to a level shift of each reaction 
function without altering the outcome of the Nash Equilibrium.
2.5 Coordination Failure
From Proposition 2, if m < m* then no one adopts the clean technology, while if 
m > m* then everyone adopts the clean technology. Furthermore, Proposition 1 defines 
the Nash prices for all firms that adopt or do not adopt the clean technology. It is 
interesting to see what happens to the profit level of each firm when all the firms behave 
in the same manner. This leads to the following Lemma:
Lemma 2: The profit earned by an individual firm when no firm adopts the clean 
technology will be the same profit level for an individual firm when all the firms adopt 
the clean technology.
Proof: If all the firms are of the same type and adopt clean technology or not, each will 
face a symmetric market size (follows from the intuition of equation (3)). Therefore, 
profit earned by an individual firm (when all adopt the clean technology) will be 
TC
* = 1t
t
N + c – c
2
= tN 2  (follows from Proposition 1 and equation (8)). Similarly, 
the profit earned by an individual firm when no one adopts the clean technology 
8 If we were to change the model and assumed delivered pricing where firms would bear transport costs 
then their marginal costs will increase. Qualitatively our results will still hold.
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will be TE* =
1
t
t
N
2
 (follows from Proposition 1 and equation (8). This implies that 
TC
* = TE* =
t
N 2 .
Lemma 2 tells us when there is symmetric technology adoption (irrespective of 
whether all firms adopt the technology or not) each individual firm will earn the same 
level of profit. This implies that when m < m* no firm adopts the clean technology and, 
in such a scenario, the profit level earned by each individual firm will be the same as 
that earned when each firm adopts a clean technology. This latter case is possible, if 
and only if, all the firms cooperate to adopt the same clean technology at the same time. 
This implies that we need a global coordinator to establish an outcome where everyone 
adopts the clean technology even though m < m*.
3. Welfare Analysis
This section investigates the optimal level of m and compares this optimal level 
to the outcome of the free market economy.9 Assume that the social planner of each 
country is only concerned about the damage arising from the total world volume of 
pollution emissions and he or she is willing to cooperate to reduce this volume. In order 
to do so, a social planner will calculate the economy’s loss function, which consists 
of the total volume of pollution emissions that cause damage to our environment, and 
also the total cost of adoption of clean technology. Assume that the damage function 
is linear in total volume of pollution emissions. Note that, unlike Salop’s model, we 
are not calculating total transport costs as there are N independent countries and each 
country’s social planner will not be concerned about minimizing the transport cost of the 
firms of other countries. Assume that m of total firms have adopted the clean technology, 
therefore, 1 – m of total firms have not adopted the clean technology. In our model this 
will occur when m = m* (follows from Proposition 2). Therefore, the damage function 
arising from the total volume of pollution emissions will be as follows:
X = (1 – m)sˆNqd (16)
This follows from our assumption of linearity and the condition (1). The variable 
qd is the total demand for those goods, which are produced by existing technology. For 
simplicity, we assume that each firm is located in the following sequence on the unit 
circumference of a circle:
{d0, d1, d2,......dk  –  1, ck, ck  +  1,......, c–2, c–1, d0}10. 
9 Also see Oz Shy (1995), page 156.
10 Various scenarios and, therefore, sequences are possible; we are assuming this sequence to keep our 
analysis simple.
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di represents an individual firm, which is located at i and does not adopt a clean 
technology, and cj an individual firm which is located at j and has adopted a clean 
technology. In other words, most of the firms that do not adopt the clean technology 
have neighborhood firms, which also have not adopted the clean technology and vice 
versa. The important aspect is that a border firm such as {d0} and dk  –  1 will face a 
neighborhood firm that adopts the clean technology. By using equations (2) and (3), we 
can calculate, qd for the N firm case which is as follows:
qd = [(1– m)N – 1]2x( d ,d ) + 2x( d ,c )
= [(1– m)N – 1] 1N +
1
t ( + c) +
1
N
= (1– m) + 1t ( + c)
 (17)
Here, 2x(d, d) is the demand for the goods of a firm that does not adopt the technology, 
as well as its neighborhood firms, which also do not adopt the clean technology, and 
2x(d, c) is the demands for the goods of a firm that does not adopt the technology but its 
neighborhood firms do adopt the clean technology. Without loss of generality, we can 
replace θ with its conditional expected value E(θ |m). Therefore, the above equation can 
be written as follows:
qd = (1– m) + 1t (E( | m) + c) (18)
The total cost of adoption of clean technology will be mNc. Therefore, the loss 
function denoted by  will be as follows:
min
m
= X + mNc
= (1– m)sˆN (1– m) + 1t (E( | m) + c) + mNc
= (1– m)sˆN (1– m) + 1t ( + m + c) + mNc
 (19)
Note that E(θ |m) = τ + ξm (follows from Assumption 2). The first order condition is 
∂
∂m
= 0. By solving this with respect to m, we obtain the social desired level of m, m *s, 
which is as follows: 
ms* = 1 / 2
2 sˆt + sˆ + sˆc – sˆ – ct
sˆ t –( )  (20)
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Here, = –
m
m and =
m
. We normalize t = 1 and 
m
 = 1 and re-write 
the above equation as follows:
ms* = – –2 + 2( )–1 +1 / 2 1–1+( ) sˆ c – 1 / 2
– m
–1+ – 1 / 2
2 –
–1+  (21)
For feasibility, m *s must lie in interval [0,1]. Equation (21) leads to the following 
Lemma:
Lemma 3: For given [0,1), sˆ [0,1], the following will be true:
A. m *s is increasing in μθ i.e. ∂ms
*
∂
= 12(1– ) > 0.
B. m *s is decreasing in c i.e. 
∂ms
*
∂c
= 12(1– ) (1–
1
sˆ ) ≤ 0.
C. m *s is increasing in sˆ i.e. 
∂ms
*
∂sˆ =
c
2(1– )sˆ2 > 0.
The important feature to note is that m *s is positively related to sˆ . As pollution 
increases, a social planner wants more firms to adopt the clean technology whereas an 
individual firm may not adopt the clean technology as its profit maximization problem 
fails to incorporate the effect of sˆ. Furthermore, m* (from equation (15)) decreases with 
respect to μθ but increases with respect to c, however, the opposite relationship holds 
for m *s for the same variables. This may increase the conflict of interest between a social 
planner and a profit-maximizing firm. For example, when m < m*, no individual firm 
will adopt the clean technology (follows from Proposition 2) but in that scenario the 
social planner’s m *s > 0. The following figure 4 illustrates this:
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Figure 4 Private Thresholds for Clean-Technology Adoption (m*) and Social 
Desirable Level (m *s )
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Note that, here m* is a private threshold level (whether an individual firm will 
adopt the clean technology) and m *s is a socially desirable level for the fraction of total 
firms who adopt the clean technology. We calculate both m* and m *s for the parameter 
values c = 18 , =
1
2 , m =
3
10 and sˆ =
1
10 (also by using the equations (15) and (21) 
respectively). For μθ [0,1], if any m is such that m *s ≤ m < m* then no individual firm 
will adopt the clean technology but the socially desirable level of m will be m *s > 0.11 
3.1 Policy Implication
Since the WTO encourages countries to reduce trade barriers by lowering tariffs and 
reducing subsidies, we need to look at alternative policies to encourage firms to adopt 
clean technology. This model suggests that, by educating consumers, we can achieve 
11 There also exists a scenario of over-adoption of clean technology when m > m*. m > m*, all firms will 
adopt the clean technology; however, this outcome may not be as socially desirable as m *s < 1. This will be 
true as long as μθ < 0.8 in Figure 4.
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that. As consumers receive more information regarding environmental degradation, their 
willingness to pay for clean technology will increase. This implies that μθ in equation (15) 
will increase, which will also reduce the critical m*, therefore, more firms are likely to 
adopt the clean technology (follows from Proposition 3 and equation (15)).
4. Conclusion
This paper extends Salop’s model of localized competition by allowing firms the 
choice of clean or dirty technology and introducing the consumers’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) for clean products. That is, the consumer is willing to pay more for a product 
produced with clean technology. The model can also be interpreted as a world economy 
model where each firm represents a country. Given the cost of adopting new technology, 
and in the presence of incomplete information, we find that there exists a critical value 
of m (an individual firm’s belief regarding clean technology adoption)m*. If m < m*, then 
no country adopts the clean technology. While, if the WTP increases, some countries 
find it profitable to adopt the clean technology, if and only if, m > m*. Finally, some 
countries will adopt the clean technology and some of them will not adopt the same 
clean technology if m = m*.  Furthermore, the WTP plays a crucial role in determining 
risk factor. The higher the expected value of θ i.e. μθ, the lower the value of m*; hence, 
more firms are likely to adopt the clean technology.
This paper also identifies the problem of coordination failure. Although symmetric 
technology adoption (irrespective of whether an individual firm adopts clean technology) 
gives the same level of profit for each firm, the outcome of clean technology adoption 
will be achieved if, and only if, all the firms cooperate. This implies that a global 
coordinator may be necessary to achieve such an outcome. 
Finally, we demonstrate that the private and public (social planner) incentives 
to adopt clean technology differ and that, given the policies of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), a solution to reducing emissions is to educate/inform the consumer 
in order to increase their WTP.
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